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Re-created Flatness: Hans Hofmann’s Concept
of the Picture Plane as a Medium of Expression
Michael Schreyach
There is a fundamental difference between flatness and flatness. There can
be a flatness that is meaningless and there can be a flatness that is the highest expression of life—from infinity depth up to the surface: an ultimately
restor[ed] two-dimensionality. [Restoring flatness] is what plastic creation
means. Otherwise it is decoration.
—Hans Hofmann, “Lecture I”1

Introduction
That “flatness” might be equivalent to “the highest expression of life” in
modern art is by no means a straightforward assertion. Isn’t flattening, after all, a key metaphor that has been used to describe the leveling down of
communal and personal experience under modernism: its attenuation by
increasingly pervasive forms of commercialized entertainment, its depletion by the spectacle of commodity culture and mass media?2 Yet, for Hans
Hofmann and Clement Greenberg, flatness—more specifically, “re-created
flatness,” a term the critic adopted after hearing it used in the painter’s important 1938–39 New York lectures—became a key term in their accounts
of pictorial meaning. In this paper, I articulate what is significant about
that idea and draw out its implications for understanding what Hofmann
meant by artistic expression. Ultimately, I will suggest that the concept of
re-created flatness, and its pictorial realization, implies or entails a certain
view of expression: namely, that what is expressed by an artwork is the artMichael Schreyach is associate professor in the Department of Art and Art History at
Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas, and currently holds a Terra Foundation Visiting Professorship at the JFK Institute for North American Studies at the Freie Universität in Berlin. He teaches courses on modern art in the United States and Europe
from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth century, with an emphasis on modernist
painting, criticism, and theory since 1940. He has published critical essays on Jackson Pollock, Barnett Newman, Hans Hofmann, Cy Twombly, and Maurice MerleauPonty. He is currently completing a book, Jackson Pollock and the Perception of Abstract
Expressionism.
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ist’s meaning. Although he did not explicitly voice the matter in terms of
intention, Hofmann insisted that “[m]y ideal is the [artistic] creation of [my]
own inner world.”3 It is the implicit emphasis on the priority of the artist’s
meaning—the framed expression of his or her intention—in contradistinction to the audience’s contingent experiences of the work of art—that lies at
the root of both Hofmann’s teaching and Greenberg’s criticism and distinguishes “meaningless” flatness from “restored” and “re-created” flatness.
Although it might at first appear peripheral, the issue of flatness is central
to understanding aspects of contemporary debates about modernism and
postmodernism. Greenberg, of course, volunteered what has become one of
the most famous accounts of modernism in the visual arts. In a number of
key essays, beginning with “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” (1939) and “Towards
a Newer Laocoon” (1940) and culminating in “Modernist Painting” (1960)
and “After Abstract Expressionism” (1962), Greenberg suggested that modernist artists, in response both to a historical crisis and to a crisis in standards
of quality, became increasingly self-critical. To save the arts from a general
“leveling down” (or flattening) in the face of mass entertainment, they felt
the need to entrench each art in its “unique and proper area of competence”
and to demonstrate that the “kind of experience [it] provided was valuable
in its own right.”4 The project of self-definition demanded the elimination
of any extraneous conventions that impeded the discovery of the essential
conventions of each particular medium. For painters, this meant acknowledging the “limitations that constituted the medium of painting—the flat
surface, the shape of the support, the properties of pigment” (Greenberg,
Collected Essays, 86). In doing so, they were able to “find the guarantee of
[painting’s] standards of qualities as well as of its independence” (ibid.). But
the most important of these limiting conventions or norms was flatness, according to Greenberg, “[f]or [it] alone was unique and exclusive to pictorial
art” (ibid., 87).
It seems relevant to point out what else, besides delimiting a unique
“area of competence,” might be significant about Greenberg’s flatness. It is
not simply that flatness assured quality. Indeed, Greenberg explicitly denied
that assumption: “[A] stretched or tacked-up canvas,” he wrote, “already
exists as a picture—though not necessarily as a successful one.”5 But given
the critic’s thesis that the self-definition of the arts was fueled by an anxiety
over the reduction of art to entertainment, it seems right to say that a concern for flatness expressed a concern for the autonomy of painting, for its
independence from the merely diversionary. It also seems reasonable to restate Greenberg’s proposition and say that a concern for flatness expressed a
concern for distinguishing works of art and their meanings from other kinds
of things in the world at large and our contingent experiences of them. And
insofar as it was the painter who, in open acknowledgment of the limiting
conditions of the medium, was intent on expressing himself, he necessarily
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concerned himself with the autonomy of the work of art—which is just to
say that accepting the efficacy of flatness as a limiting condition, or norm, of
painting entails recognizing that the meaning of a work of art is fixed by the
artist’s intention.6
What I have just described is a familiar trope in the turn from a modernist to postmodernist ontology of the artwork. Whereas the modernist work
of art is bounded or delimited and its meaning fixed by the artist, the postmodernist work rejects those framing conditions and opens meaning up to
the contingencies of spectatorship. In the case of some postmodernist work,
for instance, the meaning of the work becomes indistinguishable from the
experiences had by the viewer within the total situation of his encounter
with the work.7 My aim here is not to rehearse the debate but to introduce
my project with these issues in mind. In doing so, I hope that the stakes of
clarifying what Hofmann and Greenberg meant by re-created flatness will
emerge in relief.
This paper has three principle objectives. First, I overview Hofmann’s
unpublished writings and lectures on aesthetics. So far, the critical analysis
and evaluation of these materials has had little visibility in modernist studies.8 I aim not only to contribute a more specific account of Hofmann’s concepts as they were introduced through his program of aesthetic education
but also to situate them in a wider intellectual and critical context. Second, I
interpret the significance of those ideas for modernist criticism by focusing
especially on the concept of re-created flatness as it appears in the writings
of both Hofmann and Greenberg. Finally, I hope to demonstrate that Hofmann’s closely associated notions of flatness, depth, and the picture plane
are deeply implicated in the issue of modernist painting’s autonomy, especially as formulated by Greenberg.

I
Hofmann’s Teaching and Unpublished Instructional Texts
Even in summary accounts of midcentury abstraction, scholars routinely
acknowledge the impact Hans Hofmann’s ideas and pedagogic practices
had on New York School painters.9 Indeed, it is hard to underestimate how
profoundly Hofmann’s views on modern art and aesthetics—views that
had been formed through his direct involvement with the European avantgarde—stimulated the aspiring artists and critics who attended his 1938–39
lectures in New York, enrolled in his school, and encountered his writings.
The critic Clement Greenberg extolled in 1945: “[I] owe more to the initial
illumination received from Hofmann’s lectures [on modern art] than to any
other source.”10 Twelve years later, he reaffirmed the painter’s position as
a crucial disseminator. Connecting contemporary tendencies of abstraction
with Hofmann’s precedent, Greenberg lauded that “no one in the country
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had such a thorough grasp of Cubism as [he did].”11 Yet, while writers often
quote Hofmann’s statements—his famous dictum of “push-pull” is routinely invoked in studies of abstract expressionism—many of his key concepts
remain underinvestigated.12 It is true that commentators sometimes gloss
such critical terms as “flatness,” “depth,” “picture plane,” and “pictorial creation.” But the significance of those terms with respect to broader modernist
concerns has yet to be articulated. This deficiency is partly the result of Hofmann’s intellectual eclecticism. Not only are his views deeply influenced by
modern art theory (and particularly by Wassily Kandinsky, Piet Mondrian,
and Robert Delaunay), but his aesthetics also combines ideas from two disparate strains of nineteenth-century German aesthetics—empathy theory
and formalism—and furthermore includes aspects of twentieth-century
Gestalt psychology.13 From this heterogeneous mix, Hofmann generated a
robust but often obscure theory of pictorial creation that has proven notoriously difficult to parse, a task made even more difficult by its multiple iterations, its uneven translations, and the artist’s idiosyncratic use of English.
Some of Hofmann’s views were published as short essays during his lifetime, and these serve to introduce readers to his ideas.14 Still, Hofmann’s
unpublished materials more comprehensively represent his distinct theoretical and pedagogical concerns. Since the 1938–39 lectures that will most
concern me below are substantially based on the bulk of these unpublished
texts, it will be useful to review them here. Hofmann attempted to codify
his instructional method for painting and to present his theory of pictorial
creation in no less than five unpublished renditions. The first, titled “Form
und Farbe in der Gestaltung,” was written in Germany between 1915 and
1930.15 This book was translated in 1931 by Glenn Wessels in cooperation
with the author as “Creation in Form and Color: A Textbook for Instruction
in Art.”16 Hofmann extensively revised this book in German during the winter of 1933, giving it the extended title, “Das Malerbuch: Form und Farbe in
der Gestaltung.”17 It was then translated by Georgina Huck. By 1948, Hofmann had emended the translation, supplementing its content with notes
written in English (it was revised again in 1952). He began to call this material “A Painter’s Primer: Form and Color in the Creative Process.”18 In 1963,
the artist completed a fifth book-length typescript, substantially based on,
but much shorter than, his earlier efforts, titled “The Painter and His Problems: A Manual Dedicated to Painting.”19 Evidently, Hofmann considered
his theory of pictorial creation important enough to revise and sharpen it
over a period of thirty years. Still, once the confusion caused by the existence of multiple drafts, revisions, notes, and rewrites clears, a remarkable
consistency appears in the artist’s underlying ideas over the course of their
development (ideas that, it bears pointing out, were substantially formed by
the late 1930s, when Hofmann was approaching fifty). Rather than limiting
my analysis by treating them chronologically, I will refer as necessary to the
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multiple iterations of his theory in order to better explain Hofmann’s ideas,
especially as they were voiced in his 1938–39 lectures.

The Picture Plane
In 1963, Michael Fried suggested that the keynote of Memoria in Aeternum
(1962) is its effort to involve mutually two distinctly separate elements,
namely, the sharply delineated rectangles of yellow and red and the brownish background on which they seem to hover. That background is streaked
with more vibrant colors.20 Fried notes:
Between [the rectangles], flooding down through the center of the
background, is a forceful streak of blue . . . vibrant with energy. To the
left of and above the yellow rectangle are streaks of matching yellow
that flare into resonant life and make the background seem an inseparable ambience of the rectangle. . . . The end result is that the background and rectangles are integrated on the strength of color alone.
(“New York Letter,” 295)
Fried goes on to admire the fact that Hofmann seemed to have posed for
himself—and then solved—a particular pictorial problem in terms of sheer
color: specifically, to have united figure and ground and, in the process, to
have “redeemed” the background’s atmospheric effects (Fried at first had
found those effects “weak” and “corny”; ibid.). But Fried makes another,
perhaps ultimately more significant, observation. Drawing our attention to
the background once again, he notices that it “stops short of the top of the
canvas.” “This is important,” he continues, “because it asserts Hofmann’s
awareness of what I have called the background as a skin of paint that,
although it evokes the feel of atmosphere and deep space, nevertheless
remains not very far behind the picture plane” (ibid.) To illustrate the implications of his point, Fried favorably contrasts Hofmann with Kandinsky. The critic finds Kandinsky’s work of the 1920s and 1930s to consist of
shapes and forms that are, like Hofmann’s, placed within an atmospheric
space. Yet Kandinsky fails to convey “an awareness of the picture plane
as a painted surface” (ibid., 296). (Even though Kandinsky’s space is not
conventionally naturalistic, it nonetheless creates an optical sensation of
indeterminate spatial recession and thus might be described as fictive or
illusioned depth.) In contrast, Hofmann both flattens or compresses illusioned depth into a comparatively shallow register and simultaneously
acknowledges the canvas as a literally flat, painted surface, a “skin of
paint.” It is only a “manifest awareness” of cubism—and, specifically, of
its struggle to establish a picture plane in relation both to the actual surface
of the canvas as well as to its illusioned depth—that accounts for the “superiority” of Hofmann’s work.
	Evaluative judgments aside, Fried’s formal analysis helps us target an
issue of serious theoretical consequence for Hofmann. In the painter’s view,
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the creation of pictorial space, in contradistinction to what he called “realistic” or “naturalistic” space, demands above all just such a complex acknowledgment of the picture plane:
In the moment when something is not related to the picture plane we
are concerned with realistic space. [Although the artist] may not directly imitate nature, [to the extent that] he has nature in mind as the
basis for creation, his work [will yield] the idea of realistic space. [But]
a painter who understands the picture plane as the basis for creation
will never create naturalistic space, but he will create pictorial space.
(Hofmann, “Lecture V,” 1)21
Here, realistic or naturalistic space does not necessarily refer to conventional
illusionism, the verisimilitude of three dimensions. Even abstract artists are
in danger of painting realistic or naturalistic space unless they are conscious
of the picture plane. From this point of view, Fried’s account of Kandinsky
might prompt us to see his paintings as illustrating the lapse of attention
Hofmann warns against. Because he presents deep, atmospheric space occupied by abstract shapes, it is as if Kandinsky still had “nature in mind”
instead of the picture plane.22 Nonetheless, it would be insufficient for an
artist simply to abandon such a thought and replace it with a mental awareness of the picture plane because, in addition to having it in mind, Hofmann
insists that the artist accept it as the basis for creation. I take “basis” not only
to refer to the conceptual priority of the picture plane in an artist’s practical
orientation toward her work but also to invoke the literal grounding of aesthetic creation on a material surface. The dialectic implied by being aware
of the picture plane as an ontological condition of pictorial creation while
simultaneously being aware of it as a flat, painted surface shares something
with, yet goes beyond, more familiar oppositions, such as those obtaining
between literal planarity and pictorial space or actual two dimensionality
and illusioned or fictive depth.
There are at least two significant points I would like to draw out from these
observations. First, Hofmann implicitly rejects the idea that the picture plane
exists in advance of the creation of pictorial space. While it may be conceptually
prior to the activity of painting, the picture plane is not a given fact about
paintings, nor is it guaranteed to exist for all flat, painted quadrants. “Not every flat surface,” he said, “is a priori a picture plane. (“Lecture II,” 1). It must be
established, virtually, each time a painting is made. Second, because it is virtual or immaterial, the picture plane is categorically distinct from the surface
of the canvas and the paint applied to it—distinct, that is, from the material
that is the condition of its possibility. The picture plane is a “translucent relational surface” that is both created by, but irreducible to, the physical nature of
any painted surface.23 I hazard to suggest that when Hofmann employed the
term “picture plane,” he meant not only to refer to this translucent relational
surface but also to express the successful “transformation” of an actually flat
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surface area into an expressive medium that conveys pictorial content (Hofmann, Search for the Real, 70). For Hofmann, this content has everything to
do with the “spiritual expression” of “inner life” and with the “intensity” of
personal and “emotional” experience.24
As the epigraph to this paper indicates, Hofmann thought there were two
kinds of flatness, categorically distinct:
There is a fundamental difference between flatness and flatness. There
can be a flatness that is meaningless and there can be a flatness that is
the highest expression of life—from infinity depth up to the surface: an
ultimately restor[ed] two-dimensionality. [Restoring flatness] is what
plastic creation means. Otherwise it is decoration. (“Lecture 1,” 5)
Hofmann’s distinction between literal flatness (“meaningless”) and pictorial
flatness (“the highest expression of life”) is fundamental to his account of
how material is made over into an expressive medium to convey the artist’s meaning. For a painter, having the picture plane in mind as the basis
of creation involves acknowledging the fact that the actually flat canvas is
the condition that might enable the activity of marking and covering it with
pigment to become a medium for expression, instead of a mere surface. Actual flatness must be “destroyed” but then “re-created” (ibid.). Re-creating
flatness means reestablishing the picture plane as a medium for expression,
as it had been for great art in the past.25 We might say that flatness restored
is mere flatness made meaningful by artistic intention.

Depth
Hofmann holds the painter responsible for acknowledging the limitations
of, yet re-creating, the literal nature of his materials. Creating a picture plane
is the hallmark of this transformation. Its significance is inseparable from
Hofmann’s dialectical concept of flatness and depth. For him, “depth” does
not designate the sense of volume and extent we encounter phenomenally
in our experience of the natural world, nor does it refer to the abstract and
calculable space of physics and mathematics. Neither does it describe the
visual perception of three-dimensional reality produced by conventions of
verisimilitude. Rather, for Hofmann, “depth” names art’s most significant
content and is simultaneously perceptual, metaphorical, and metaphysical:
[T]he first require[ment] in pictorial art [is] the creation of depth in a
flat sense—which is pictorial depth—that is to say: depth which has
resulted from the intrinsic quality of the picture-surface [that is, the
picture plane] which permits the creation of depth without sacrificing
the picture’s two-dimensionality. (“Das Malerbuch,” n.p.)
The terms are contradictory and paradoxical and do not make much literal
sense. Depth-in-a-flat-sense must refer to pictorial content (re-created flatness) in contradistinction to actual materials (literal flatness). But it is also an
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intuitively felt “infinity-expansion,” an “actified space” that has “the quality
of flesh—it pulsates, it has sensation; it is not flat.”26 Hofmann deploys potent metaphors in his effort to describe depth’s meaning.27
The proliferation of Hofmann’s vocabulary—he seemed to be comfortable with the complexity that results from defining terms in relation to multiple others—perhaps licenses our thinking of depth-in-a-flat-sense as synonymous with the artist’s establishment of a picture plane, which we have
already seen is the medium for the artist’s meaning. In his perceptive analysis of the issue, William Seitz explains the problem Hofmann concerned
himself with. It merits extended quotation:
Assertion of the picture plane does not result in patternistic [that is,
decorative] flatness but is inseparable from depth. . . . Optically the
plane is always in a state of active tension. . . . Not a material wall,
the plane is established [in Hofmann’s phrase] “in a spiritual sense.”
Much more than a technical or formal criterion, it is at the crux of the
problem of translating three-dimensional nature or formless human
feeling into a two-dimensional medium.28
It is the relation of the medium to the artist’s meaning that emerges as the essential issue here. Seitz reveals the substance of Hofmann’s concern for depth
as re-created flatness. If, as the painter often said, “[T]he medium of expression of painting is the picture plane,” then what that medium expresses, even
if it begins as “formless human feeling,” is the artist’s meaning (Hofmann,
“Creation in Form and Color,” 158). Hofmann made his intentionalist position clear in his strident closing remark to a lecture he delivered in 1941 at the
American Abstract Artists symposium: “Every creative artist works continually to . . . develop to the point where he can say what he has to say, and [say
it] in his own language. This language is of course not always at once understood. It makes people furious when you speak your own language.”29

Hofmann’s 1938–39 Lectures
Hofmann’s effort to articulate the nuances of his modernist aesthetic vocabulary permeated his 1938–39 lectures. Because I presently will address
how certain aspects of Greenberg’s account of cubism owe something to
Hofmann, I pause here to emphasize a few points about that connection.
As I have said, Greenberg often remarked on Hofmann’s impact on him.
But if it were ever in question, the magnitude of that debt becomes increasingly visible when we attend to some essays the critic began writing exactly
two decades later. At that time, Greenberg was simultaneously extending
his analysis of cubism in “The Pasted-Paper Revolution” (1958) and “Collage” (1959/1961), drafting “Modernist Painting” (1960) (in which “flatness”
plays a key role), preparing his selected essays for Art and Culture (1961),
and completing his book Hofmann (1961). It is also clear that, during this
period of work, Hofmann’s 1938–39 lectures were on his mind.
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Greenberg’s papers contain mimeographed, typed transcripts of all six
Hofmann lectures (fifty-three pages total).30 Significantly, the copies are located in the same file that contains essay drafts and notes for his monograph
on the artist, so it is likely that Greenberg was actively consulting the lectures again while preparing it. Throughout the decade, Greenberg regularly
recalled Hofmann. In 1955, he testified (in “‘American-Type’ Painting”) to
the persistent visibility of Hofmann and his school as crucial factors in the
development of abstraction in New York.31 That same year, he wrote a biographical and interpretative essay for Hofmann’s retrospective at Bennington College, where he made specific reference to the lectures: “Few people
have absorbed Cubism as thoroughly as Hofmann has, and even fewer are
as well able to convey its gist to others.”32 The retrospective seems to have
stimulated the critic. He began to write extensively on Hofmann, in “New
York Painting Only Yesterday” (1957), “Hans Hofmann: Grand Old Rebel”
(1959), and “Introduction to an Exhibition of Hans Hofmann at Kootz Gallery” (1959). Finally, his book Hofmann constitutes the culmination of Greenberg’s critical analysis and evaluation of the painter’s art.33
This detour through Greenberg’s writings demonstrates the chronological simultaneity of his most significant work on cubism and his work on
Hofmann. It also gives us reason to suspect that the painter’s ideas about
flatness, depth, and the picture plane—which Greenberg first encountered
in the late 1930s but vividly recalled in the late 1950s—deeply informed the
critic’s accounts of cubist collage (I think they were pivotal for “Modernist
Painting” as well).34 But my goal here is not simply to illustrate that Hofmann influenced Greenberg. Greenberg’s independence of mind inflects
his ideas about flatness with certain nuances without precedence in Hofmann’s lectures. Yet, especially in their analyses of cubism, they both fasten
on a concept of the picture plane as the means by which an artist transforms
painting’s material limits into a medium of expression, a formulation that
merits some detailed explication. Reading Greenberg, that is, will help us
not only to be more perspicacious about Hofmann but will facilitate the reframing of Hofmann’s aesthetic theories more broadly in terms of some issues of critical importance to Greenberg—namely, modernist autonomy and
artistic meaning.

II
Flatness and the Re-creation of Flatness
In his 1945 obituary of Kandinsky (written in the form of an exhibition review), Greenberg made a telling reference to Hofmann. The critic was explaining that Kandinsky failed to understand the implications of cubism.
(Fried, as I suggested above, would later seem to concur.) In fact, he found
the native Russian’s paintings of the 1920s to “represent a misconception,
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not only of cubism and its antecedents, but of the very art of putting paint
on canvas to make a picture.”35 What was the problem? The answer comes
in two parts. First, Greenberg explicitly invokes Hofmann’s concept of the
picture plane. Kandinsky, he says, routinely lost “the sense of a continuous
surface” that Hofmann stressed must be kept in mind as a basis for creation
(“Obituary and Review,” 5). While in theory Kandinsky seemed to regard the
finite limits of the bounded surface as facts to be transformed plastically, in
practice he failed to establish a picture plane. The result was an “inactive and
meaningless” space indeterminately occupied by “an aggregate of discrete
shapes” (ibid.). His surfaces, Greenberg would say in the Art and Culture
revision of the obituary, were “mere receptacle[s].”36 Second, he implicitly
invokes Hofmann’s distinction between flatness and flatness—one meaningful and the other meaningless. It is not hard to fathom that “mak[ing]
a picture” is qualitatively different from “putting paint on canvas.” The
activities differ, and so do the results: a “picture” is something more than
“paint on canvas.” Yet the latter is a material condition for the former, and
it was both the consciousness of and overcoming of this condition that distinguished the cubist achievement, namely, “its recapture of the literal realization of the physical limitations and conditions of the medium and of the
positive advantages to be gained from the exploitation of these very limitations” (“Obituary and Review,” 5).37 In other words, Kandinsky’s surfaces
had not become pictorial because an awareness of the limitations of the medium (paint on canvas) had not been made to function as an essential part of
his art (making a picture).38
Another consequence of Kandinsky’s failure to create a picture plane
in Hofmann’s sense of the term was to leave his art beholden to conventional standards of coherence. “Academic reminiscences,” Greenberg says,
had “crept into them” (“Obituary and Review,” 5). Because they were nonrepresentational, Kandinsky’s paintings may at first have appeared to free
themselves from Western pictorial art’s dependence on verisimilitude. Yet
his continued allusion to naturalistic or atmospheric space qualified that
independence. The coherence or integrity of his pictures, instead of being
a function of the picture plane, rested on the integrity of an illusion of threedimensional space, however atmospheric it might be.39
Given these reservations, it is not surprising that in Greenberg’s longer
1948 essay, the theme of “pictorial structure” emerges strongly.40 Kandinsky thought he found in cubism a model for nonrepresentational painting,
but unrepentant abstraction was not, according to Greenberg, what originally motivated Picasso and Braque (far from it, as we will see). Abstraction was a “by-product” of their main goal, which, we are now told, was
the “reconstruction of the picture surface” (Greenberg, “Kandinsky,” 113).
In opposition to the naturalistic space of Kandinsky’s box-like receptacles,
pictorial space—which, as I have explained, is not incommensurate with
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flatness—demanded a new, even radical, understanding of the picture
plane. This Kandinsky’s paintings are unable to demonstrate:
For him, the picture plane remained something negatively given
and inert, not something that acted upon and controlled the drawing, placing, color and size of a shape or line, and whose flatness was
re-created by the configurations upon it, or at least (as with the Old
Masters) reinvoked. (Ibid.)
In saying that the picture plane “act[s] upon and control[s]” artistic activity, Greenberg refers partly to the reciprocal relation that naturally obtains
between an artist and his materials. At the same time, his emphasis on a
surface that is “recaptured,” “reconstructed,” “reinvoked,” or “re-created”
also points to the status of the picture plane as a medium of expression, not
merely as a surface that stages an encounter or indexes a feedback loop.
In his 1938–39 lectures, Hofmann too had discussed the way German
painters, including Kandinsky, understood the picture plane in contrast to
painters in France. German artists, he said, took the picture plane as merely
flat, “a flat thing [upon which] to work,” as “a means to create surface beauty” (“Lecture III,” 3), whereas those in Paris “create[d] depth beauty,” the
result of “respect[ing] the essence of the picture plane” as a medium (ibid.).
In his implicit distinction between the decorative (surface beauty) and the
pictorial (depth beauty), Hofmann’s evaluation of Kandinsky’s flatness is
somewhat the inverse of Greenberg’s (recall that the critic accused the abstract painter of never really departing from the naturalistic, painting-ascontainer model). But what is more interesting is the terminology Greenberg
will borrow from Hofmann, who distinguishes between the two conceptions
of the picture plane by saying that “one stays on the surface; the other recreates the surface”: “In [the first] case the surface is not destroyed from the
beginning [it remains something to stay on]; in the [second] it is destroyed
[in order] to re-create” (“Lecture IV,” 1). Kandinsky’s decorative tendency
causes him to stay on the surface and led him, as Greenberg later points out,
“to conceive of abstractness as a question down at bottom of illustration, and
therefore all the more as an end instead of as a means to the realization of an
urgent vision” (“Kandinsky,” 112).41
Greenberg first used “re-created flatness” in a 1947 review of Jackson
Pollock’s work.42 Commenting on such paintings as Shimmering Substance
(1946) and Eyes in the Heat (1946), the critic noted the “consistency and power of surface” the artist’s pictures exhibited.43 “As is the case with almost all
post-cubist painting of any real originality,” Greenberg went on, “it is the
tension inherent in the constructed, re-created flatness of the surface that
produces the strength of [Pollock’s] art.”44 Those who were unfamiliar with
the concept’s broader implications as I have discussed them above may have
ignored its apparent idiosyncrasy. Or they may simply have taken Green-
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berg to be referring to the idea that Pollock’s “over-all evenness,” which the
critic mentions in his next paragraph, returns to the painted—even thickly
painted—surface a degree of visual flatness. But given what we have seen of
the theoretical weight of “re-created flatness,” I hazard to guess more was at
stake. I think what was at stake was a conception of the artist’s meaning—
his “urgent vision”—as conditioned by, but not limited by, the materials of
the medium. To re-create flatness was to render the materials an autonomous medium by which an artist could express himself.45

Cubism
Greenberg admired Hofmann’s “reluctance to cut himself off from Cubism
as a base of operations” (Hofmann, 25). Still, there were occasions when the
critic thought the painter, like Kandinsky, seemed to “stay on the surface,”
and to adopt cubist forms—specifically its quasi-geometric grid of lines and
shapes aligned with the canvas’s framing edges—stylistically, as mere devices for ordering pictorial elements and for achieving a certain degree of
pictorial coherence in the absence of a model in nature. In such instances,
Hofmann seemed to forget the lesson of his own lectures, to abandon his precept that an artist maintain an awareness both of the limiting conditions of
painting and of the picture plane as a basis of creation. Indeed, a lapse of attention by any artist would lead to the same problems of space-as-container
experienced by Kandinsky, or so at least Greenberg suggests in his book on
Hofmann:
The Old Masters were apt to conceive of the picture, with its enclosing shape and flat surface, as a receptacle into which things were put,
whereas modernist painting tends increasingly to erase this distinction and make the picture as such coincide with its literal, physical
self. (Hofmann, 32)
Using the conventional illusionism of the Old Masters as a foil, Greenberg
tells us that modernist flatness is “ineluctable”: it is a constraint or demand
that cannot be ignored.46 But it is also what guarantees painting as an expressive medium, as potentially becoming something other than merely
“putting paint on a canvas.”
Those familiar with Greenberg’s writings will notice that the passage I
just quoted is similar to a more famous one that appears nearly contemporaneously in “Modernist Painting” (1960). But in that essay, Greenberg
makes a crucial revision. He enriches his analysis with terms drawn from
Hofmann’s lectures:
The Old Masters had sensed that it was necessary to preserve what is
called the integrity of the picture plane: that is, to signify the enduring presence of flatness underneath and above the most vivid illusion
of three-dimensional space. The apparent contradiction involved was
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essential to the success of their art, as it is indeed to the success of all
pictorial art. The Modernists have neither avoided nor resolved this
contradiction; rather, they have reversed its terms. One is made aware
of the flatness of their pictures before, instead of after, being made
aware of what the flatness contains.47
Before, Greenberg had accused the Old Masters of treating their picture surfaces as mere receptacles or containers, but now he corrected that reductive
claim. They, too, acknowledged the limitations of painting (“the enduring
presence of flatness”) and understood the picture plane simultaneously
to signify those limitations and to operate as the medium of their pictorial
transformation (to guarantee the “success of their art”). Modernists, too,
want success. But, under modern conditions, this success seemed increasingly to depend on the degree to which the work of art could paradoxically
distinguish itself from—yet acknowledge the conditions of—its literal materials.48 Greenberg seems to be suggesting that paintings’ success depends on
establishing what amounts to an ontological distinction between the picture
as an autonomous artwork and the picture as an object.49 Should the picture
remain a mere object, it would be part of the world at large, an occasion or
stimulus for any kind of experience whatsoever. But as a work of art, the
painting is meant not to generate just any response but to express something
that an artist intended. (Alternatively, we might say that it frames the conditions of its own beholding.) In other words, what Greenberg called art’s
“success” seems to depend on the degree to which the artist’s meaning—
what she wanted to express—could be insulated from the arbitrary meanings imputed to her work by a viewer.50
Greenberg’s account of cubism most fully pursues the idea of “re-created”
flatness in relation to the issues of the picture plane and expression I have
so far discussed. It is hard to ignore the obvious debt his two major essays,
“The Pasted-Paper Revolution” (1958) and “Collage” (1959/1961), owe to
Hofmann’s teachings on cubism.51 Although the texts differ in some key
ways, I will consolidate my analysis of them here and quote from either one
or the other as I deem it necessary to highlight the issues at stake.
Greenberg begins each essay by asserting a somewhat counterintuitive
claim. For Picasso and Braque, he argued, cubism remained “an art of representation and illusion” (“Collage,” 70–71). But it was also evident that
the “fictive depths” of cubist pictures were becoming increasingly shallow
(“Pasted-Paper Revolution,” 61). Indeed, fictive depth was becoming so
shallow that it seemed to be in danger of coinciding with the literal, flat
surface of the canvas. If that happened, Greenberg thought, illusion would
become mere decoration. He insisted that when there is no discrimination
between literal surface and fictive depth, the result is just “surface pattern”
(ibid., 62) or “cadences of design” (“Collage,” 71). Picasso and Braque want
to “restore and exalt decoration by building it, by endowing self-confessedly
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flat configurations with a pictorial content, [with] an autonomy” (“PastedPaper Revolution,” 66).
Braque’s solution to the problem, Greenberg explains, is to “spell out” or
make explicit the literal flatness of the physical canvas. Applying stenciled
letters and numbers to his surfaces allowed the painter to specify literal flatness to the degree that other pictorial elements were “pushed into illusioned
space by force of contrast” (“Pasted-Paper Revolution,” 62). Once “brute,
undepicted flatness” was in view, Braque’s paintings could preserve the illusion of a very shallow—but still salient—fictive depth between that literal
flatness and the “depicted flatness” of cubist facet-planes (“Collage,” 72).
Greenberg is saying that the cubist project was committed to securing
or preserving illusion without either (1) capitulating to mere decoration or
surface pattern or (2) creating conventional, three-dimensional depth. As
cubist space became shallower and as the “process of flattening seemed
inexorable,” Picasso and Braque were increasingly taxed to advertise the
literal surface so that illusion could be separated from it (“Collage,” 74). The
declaration of the surface reached a “vehement” extreme when they pasted
papers onto it, “establish[ing] undepicted flatness bodily” (ibid., 75). But that
maneuver intensified literal, undepicted flatness to such a degree that illusion had, as it were, no place to go except in front of or on the literal surface.
At this point, literal, undepicted flatness seemed to be “infect[ing]” illusion (“Collage,” 73–74). But as Greenberg puts it,
Flatness may now monopolize everything, but it is flatness become
so ambiguous and expanded as to turn into illusion itself—at least an
optical if not, properly speaking, a pictorial illusion. Depicted, Cubist flatness is now almost completely assimilated to the literal, undepicted kind, but at the same time it reacts upon and largely transforms
the undepicted kind—and it does so, moreover, without depriving the
latter of its literalness; rather, it underpins and reinforces that literalness, re-creates it. (Ibid., 77)
Cubism’s “reconstructed” flatness yields pictorial content (“Pasted-Paper
Revolution,” 66). For Greenberg, that content had to do with the way cubism “isolated” plasticity, preserving generalized illusion—illusion as such—
independently of conventional, three-dimensional representational means
(“Collage,” 77).
But the crucial point of Greenberg’s account is that, in order to achieve
pictorial content under the conditions he attributes to the cubist project (that
is, under the charge of retaining illusion without resorting to the conventional representation of three-dimensional space and of avoiding mere surface pattern or decoration), literal flatness must be continually “re-created”
(“Collage,” 77) or “reconstruct[ed]” (“Pasted-Paper Revolution,” 65). The
literal surface, in other words, must be transformed into a “picture surface”
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that can hold or sustain a “surface resonance [that is] derived directly from
an underlying illusion which, however schematic, [is] fully felt” (“Collage,”
80 and 77). This surface resonance is the picture plane. What is fully felt is
what the artist expresses through it.

Nonreconciliation
Having arrived at this understanding of Greenberg’s argument, it will be
worthwhile to review one of the most recent, and certainly most considered,
readings of the critic’s account of cubism, Lisa Florman’s “The Flattening
of ‘Collage.’” Her argument bears directly on the issues of autonomy and
meaning that are emerging in my essay. Florman begins her essay by summarizing Greenberg’s account of modernism in terms parallel to those I adopted above. She likewise finds the process of self-criticism to be a kind of
defense strategy provoked both by the “deadening effects of contemporary
society” and by the threat posed to traditional cultural standards and values
by “capitalism’s inexorable commodification.”52
To her credit, Florman refuses to see Greenberg’s appeal to medium-
specificity—to modernism’s process of self-definition—as narrowly essentialist (as others frequently do). Rather, it is “fully dialectical”: “Literal
flatness,” she writes, “is a condition that modernist painting had to acknowledge, but to which it refused to be fully reconciled.”53 The relevant statement
by Greenberg, in “Collage,” reads: “Painting had to spell out, rather than
pretend to deny, the physical fact that it was flat, even though at the same
time, it had to overcome this proclaimed flatness as an aesthetic fact” (71).
The connotation of the word “overcome” as a transcending of contingency seems to draw Florman’s attention and to encourage this summary of
Greenberg’s position:
[I]nsofar as the intention was to overcome (and not merely to deny)
the literal flatness of the painting’s material support, the effort [of cubism] was doomed to failure. . . . [I]t is precisely this nonreconciliation to
flatness—to, we might say, the unavoidable conditions of [painting’s]
own existence—that characterizes Cubism, and presumably modernist painting more generally. It is also what generated for it a history.
Faced with the impossible demand to simultaneously spell out and
overcome its literal flatness, Cubist painting was driven to ever more
extreme measures; its history appears, as a result, as a succession of
retrospective, dialectical responses to its inability to free itself from its
own extra-aesthetic contingencies.54
In a provocative parallel, Florman finds aspects of Adorno’s negative dialectics harbored within Greenberg’s account of modernism. Modernism’s
nonreconciliation to flatness is an instance of making visible in art the constraints on its ideal of absolute freedom, its independence from any external determination: “Every autonomous work,” she writes, “is bound . . . to
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show what does not bind it, and in this way necessarily reveals its inability
to escape entirely from the world it aims to transcend. [Modernist art] fails
to be free and yet remains unreconciled to that failure.”55
There is much in Florman’s account that helps us target the deeper implications of Greenberg’s insistence on medium-specificity as an instance
of modernist self-criticism and that thus allows us to understand better its
internally driven, yet radically contingent, history. For what the “essential”
or “intrinsic quality” of the medium is—as both Hofmann and Greenberg
were quick to point out—is not given in advance.56 But I wonder if the term
“nonreconciliation” adequately describes the relation between Greenberg’s
(and Hofmann’s) ideas about flatness as limiting conditions and the nature
of the expressive medium as I have explicated it above.57
In Florman’s essay, there seem to be two possible ways to understand
nonreconciliation. First, the nonreconciliation she attributes to cubism—on
Greenberg’s account of it—could be a nonreconciliation on the part of Picasso
and Braque to accept the fact that a literally flat surface, as a necessary condition of painting, mattered for pictorial content to be created, for meaning to be
expressed. At least, this is how I read Florman’s gloss on Greenberg, which
I quoted above, that literal flatness is a condition to which modernist painting “refused to be fully reconciled.” The suggestion is that the cubist painters were unsure about whether their acknowledgment of the actual surface
was a vital aspect of creating pictorial meaning. They were reflexively unreconciled, we might say, to the salience of their own procedures in relation
to their actual surfaces. Second—assuming that the cubists did indeed take
the literal fact of flatness to matter significantly—there is the opportunity to
understand nonreconciliation to mean that Picasso and Braque were unreconciled to the failure of “overcom[ing]” literal flatness, unreconciled to the
failure of “transform[ing]” or “transcend[ing]” it. Here, the transitive sense
of the term leads me to suspect that nonreconciliation designates a kind of
strained disappointment, an unwillingness to accept the fact that relations
between “flatness” and “flatness” have not been resolved or restored—as indeed Florman suggests when she speaks of modernist art’s failure to be free,
yet “remain[ing] unreconciled to that failure.”58
I tend to think that it is the latter sense of nonreconciliation that is most
important to Florman. And I agree that the struggle to resolve the tension
between literal and pictorial flatness is fundamental to modernist painting’s history. Still, I think there is room to suggest that Greenberg’s and
Hofmann’s notion of “re-created flatness” underscores a reconciliation to the
conditions that make expression—make a medium—possible. Self-evidently,
the literal flatness of the physical support constrains all paintings. But
Greenberg does not seem to insist that such constraints should be overcome
in the sense of transcended (although he uses the word “overcome,” it is
to my mind a poor choice): rather, he considers that such constraints must
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become “positive factors [to be] acknowledged openly” (as Florman herself recognizes).59 Hofmann concurred: “The process of formal creation as
such is unthinkable without direct dependence upon . . . material” (“Creation in Form and Color,” 30). Expression, he held, “admit[s] exploration
only through the limiting principles which are proper to [a] medium” (ibid.).
Finally, he asserted, “No pictorial fixation would be possible without an a
priori given physical limitation. Pictorial limitation makes [plastic creation]
possible” (“Das Malerbuch,” n.p.). It is the positive moment of being reconciled to fact—to contingency, to literal flatness, to actual constraint—as the
necessary condition of an expressive medium that makes pictorial creation,
as Hofmann understood it, a possibility: “The infinite can be created only on
the basis of limitation” (Search for the Real, 59). And while there certainly is in
Greenberg’s writings a suggestion that modernism’s history is comprised of
increasingly extreme responses to the inability of painting to free itself from
its material conditions, there is also the implication that that history unfolds
through painters’ increasing acceptance of (their reconciliation to) the contingencies that are the condition of possibility for their meaning.

Limitations and Expression
As I understand Greenberg’s model of autonomy, the limiting factors of
painting secure its proper domain of experience against the deadening and
leveling effects caused by modern forms of rationalization, industry, and entertainment. But I also take the implications of his (and Hofmann’s) position
to mean that these limits secure the artist’s expression, her meaning, against
the arbitrary meanings a viewer would ascribe to her art.
“A consciousness of limitation,” Hofmann wrote in Search for the Real, “is
paramount for an expression” (43). To him, re-creating flatness was predicated on the artist’s double awareness of the literal flatness of the support
and its enclosing shape and the creative establishment of a picture plane as
a medium of expression. That awareness—and particularly the ontological
distinction it allows us to discern between the raw materials of expression
and the expression of meaning—underpins modernist art:
Your paper is limited. . . . Within its confines is the complete creative
message. Every thing you do is definitely related to the paper. . . . The
more the work progresses, the more it becomes defined or qualified. It
increasingly limits itself. Your paper is a world in itself. . . . The work
of art is firmly established as an independent object: this [is what]
makes it a picture. Outside of it is the outer world. Inside of it, the
world of an artist. (Search for the Real, 42–43)60
The expression of a “complete creative message” (or the “realization of
an urgent vision” as Greenberg put it) necessitates—perhaps it still sounds

JAE 49_1 text.indd 60

1/13/15 7:57 AM

Picture Plane as a Medium of Expression  61
paradoxical—limits. The critic elaborated on the implications of this tenet
for any effort to generate pictorial meaning:
[T]he making of pictures means, among other things, the deliberate
creating or choosing of a flat surface, and the deliberate circumscribing and limiting of it. This deliberateness is precisely what Modernist
painting harps on: the fact, that is, that the limiting conditions of art
are altogether human conditions.61
For an artist to acknowledge that the limiting conditions of painting are
what enable it to be made into an expressive medium is for her to recognize
the prospect of achieving autonomy—of creating out of limited means her
own meaning, which may take unlimited forms. To accept that those material limits are analogous to human ones is to be reconciled to the finitude
that makes sharing a possibility.62
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219–23.
32. Greenberg, “Introduction to an Exhibition of Hans Hofmann,” 242.
33. Greenberg, “New York Painting Only Yesterday” [1957], Collected Essays, 4:19–26;
“Hans Hofmann: Grand Old Rebel” [1959], Collected Essays, 4:67–73; and “Introduction to an Exhibition of Hans Hofmann at Kootz Gallery” [1959], Collected Essays, 4:73–74. The first half of Greenberg’s monograph, Hofmann (Paris: Georges
Fall, 1961) reprints “Grand Old Rebel.” References to Hofmann will be cited in the
text.
34.	Ellen Landau likewise notes an important connection between Hofmann’s ideas
and Greenberg’s but does not pursue it extensively, in “Space and Pictorial Life:
Hans Hofmann’s Smaragd Red and Germinating Yellow,” The Bulletin of the Cleveland Museum of Art 72, no. 5 (1985), 310–22 (see especially 322n25).
35. Greenberg, “Obituary and Review of an Exhibition of Kandinsky” [1945], Collected Essays, 2:4. Further references to this essay will be cited in the text.
36. Greenberg, “Kandinsky” [1948/1957], Art and Culture: Critical Essays (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1961), 113. Further references to this essay will be cited in the text.
37. “Recapture” suggests that Greenberg, like Hofmann, thought that this sensibility
had existed in art prior to modernism.
38. I am guided here by Michael Fried’s comments on Manet in “Modernist Painting
and Formal Criticism” [1964], republished as part 1 in Three American Painters
[1965], in Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews, 213–65; esp. 260–61n4.
39. As Lisa Florman pointed out to me, Kandinsky (at least in theory) also understood the picture plane as distinct from the literal surface. His arguments about
painting’s ability to transcend matter (to become “spiritual”) rested on first identifying representation (whether figurative or abstract) with materiality. To negate
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representation with nonobjective painting, then, would be to negate and thus
transcend materiality.
40. In Art and Culture, “Kandinsky” is noted as being written in “1948/1957,” but it
is substantially based on the 1945 obituary and review (it is in the later of the two
essays that “re-created flatness” makes its appearance).
41. The issue of the decorative in Hofmann’s thought is beyond the scope of this paper, but a quote will direct interested readers to possible points of departure: “A
plastic work has always, however, a decorative quality, but not every decorative
work has a plastic quality. There are therefore two kinds of decorative qualities
[just as there are two kinds of flatness]. The one, which I call negative, is without
pictorial substance. The other, which I call positive, is pictorial substance” (Hofmann, “Address,” 166). On the theme of decoration and autonomy in Greenberg,
see especially “The Crisis of the Easel Picture” [1948]; Collected Essays, 2:221–25.
42. Greenberg, “Review of Exhibitions of Jean Dubuffet and Jackson Pollock” [1947],
Collected Essays, 2:125. Note that, in the reprint of this review in Collected Essays,
the typesetting of the page necessitates a hyphenated “re-” at the line break,
possibly creating some uncertainty about whether Greenberg meant “recreated”
or “re-created.” It is indeed hyphenated in its original publication (The Nation
[February 1, 1947], 137). Greenberg later used the variant “created flatness” to describe successful painterly abstraction in “The ‘Crisis’ of Abstract Art,” Collected
Essays, 4:181.
43. Greenberg, “Review of Exhibitions of Jean Dubuffet and Jackson Pollock,” 124.
44. Ibid., 124–25.
45. For a discussion of this point in relation to Pollock’s Mural (1943), see Michael
Schreyach, “The Crisis of Jackson Pollock’s Mural as a Painting,” Getty Research
Journal no. 7 (forthcoming 2015).
46. Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” 87.
47. Ibid. As the paragraph in “Modernist Painting” is more elaborate, I speculate
that Greenberg first expressed the idea in a more rudimentary form before 1960,
perhaps in an early draft of the Hofmann monograph (eventually published in
1961), then subsequently revised it for the essay (which had originally been written for a radio broadcast in the spring of 1960). Yet evidently, the essay that was
written later ended up being published first. Francis Frascina details the origin
and permutations of this essay in “Institutions, Culture, and America’s ‘Cold
War Years’: The Making of Greenberg’s ‘Modernist Painting,’” Oxford Art Journal
26, no. 1 (2003): 69–97, esp. 72n8.
48. For an extended analysis of this issue, see Robert Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), esp. 1–44. See also Stephen Melville,
Philosophy Beside Itself: On Deconstruction and Modernism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).
49. Greenberg’s analysis prompts a reconsideration of a commonly held, but narrow,
view of autonomy. Later commentators have unfairly accused the critic of upholding the clearly untenable view that art is separate from life, detached from
the world, removed from or independent of its historical context. Against this
reductive cliché, autonomy, on Greenberg’s account, is attained only within and
in relation to a set of historical conventions. For him, autonomy is dialectical,
its status determined—or rather, achieved—by an artist who acknowledges the
conventions of his medium as limiting factors that are the very condition of pictorial expression.
50.	On this point and in following ones, I follow aspects of Lisa Siraganian’s analysis
of modernist autonomy in Modernism’s Other Work: The Art Object’s Political Life
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). The most explicit argument concerning
the shift from questions about the ontology of the text (or artwork) to a concern
for the primacy of the subject’s experience of an object is Walter Benn Michaels,
The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the End of History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
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 niversity Press, 2004), esp. “The Blank Page,” 1–18. Michaels’s title refers to the
U
date of publication of the seminal essay on the distinction between artworks and
objects and against meaning’s dependence on the spectator: Michael Fried’s “Art
and Objecthood” [1967].
51. Greenberg, “Collage” [1959/1961], Art and Culture, 70–83; “The Pasted-Paper
Revolution” [1958], Collected Essays, 61–66. Further references to both essays will
be cited in the text. Lisa Florman points out that “Collage” should not be taken as
a straightforward revision of “The Pasted-Paper Revolution” (the latter essay is,
in fact, a reworking of a 1948 exhibition review of the Museum of Modern Art’s
Collage show). Florman’s is the best and most extensive analysis of Greenberg’s
essays available. See “The Flattening of ‘Collage,’” October 102 (2002), 59–86.
Also relevant for the present discussion is Florman, “Different Facets of Analytic
Cubism,” nonsite.org, Issue #5: http://nonsite.org/feature/different-facets-of
-analytic-cubism (accessed September 1, 2014).
52. Florman, “The Flattening of ‘Collage,’” 63.
53. Ibid., 65.
54. Ibid., 68. Emphasis added.
55. Ibid., 70. On Adorno, Florman (ibid., 71n36) cites Gregg M. Horowitz, “Art History and Autonomy,” in The Semblance of Subjectivity: Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory,
ed. T. Huhn and L. Zuidervaart (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 263–64: “It is
. . . the failure to win that keeps art in motion, keeps it unreconciled, thus battling
against the realm of external determination, which itself grows more obdurate
with each failure.”
56.	Hofmann: “The artist’s technical problem is how to transform the material with
which he works back into the sphere of the spirit. . . . Still, it is not clear what
the intrinsic qualities in a medium actually are that make the metamorphosis
from the physical into the spiritual possible” (Search for the Real, 40). Unfortunately, a reductive reading of Greenberg’s medium-specificity dominates the
field. Through sheer repetition, commentators have successfully converted his
account of modernist self-criticism it into a cliché. They take “flatness” only in
the literal sense, conflating the concept of medium-specificity with a teleological unveiling of truth or essence. It is such narrow essentialism that essays like
Florman’s help us overcome. Medium-specificity refers not to a progressive but
rather a contingent discovery of what constitutes a medium under particular
historical conditions.
57. Much more about the issue of flatness could, of course, be said. I have barely
touched on the intricacies of the issue as it appears in the writings of T. J. Clark
and Michael Fried, whose differences on the problem are as instructive as their
agreements. Clark claims that the interest shown by Manet and the Impressionists in the “literal presence of the support” was “compelling and tractable for art”
because “it was made to stand for something: some particular and substantial set
of qualities which took their place in a picture of the world.” Flatness could be an
analogue for the “Popular” or the plain and workmanlike; it could signify modernity and fashion; and it could stand for the “evenness of seeing itself, the actual form of our knowledge of things” (Clark, The Painting of Modern Life, 12–13).
Fried discusses Clark’s position on flatness in relation to Greenberg in Manet’s
Modernism, or The Face of Painting in the 1860s (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1996), 15–17. In a footnote to his discussion, Fried remarks that there is a
difference between Clark’s emphasis on flatness as exemplifying a “skepticism
and unsureness about the nature of pictorial representation” and his own sense
of Manet’s “deliberate strategy of underscoring the ‘paintingness’ of his pictures
of the 1860s”: a paintingness that had everything to do with the “flatness and
rectangularity of the picture plane” (466–67n61). It is here, too, that Fried firmly
repudiates the “ahistorically essentialist notion” that a medium has “intrinsic”
qualities that are fixed or determined outside the history of art.
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“The Flattening of Florman, ‘Collage,’” 70. Aspects of Florman’s account parallel
Clark’s view of modernism. Clark invokes Hegel in his account of abstract expressionism, which begins with his ruminations on our inability to make painting by Hofmann and his contemporaries “a thing of the past” (“In Defense of
Abstract Expressionism” [1994], in Farewell to an Idea [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999], 371). Modernism is caught in a “can’t go on, will go on” syndrome: stuck in a cycle of wanting “to go on giving Idea and the World sensuous
immediacy,” finding that it cannot and then making that failure “a persistent,
maybe sufficient, subject” for art (372). It seems not unreasonable to hear an echo
of the theme of nonreconciliation here (especially in relation to Clark’s references
to “disenchantment”). For more on that point, see Jay Bernstein, “The Death of
Sensuous Particulars: Adorno and Abstract Expressionism,” Radical Philosophy
76 (1996): 7–18.
Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” 86.
There is an analogy to be made here with Hofmann’s theory of vision. In a section of “Das Malerbuch” that is not often repeated in other iterations of Hofmann’s essays, he makes some interesting comments on the limitations of our
field of vision as conditions for apprehending the world plastically: “The visual
process is limited on all sides by the field of vision, [which is] determined by the
limited optical capacity of our eyes, and by the physical construction of our eyes.
Without limitation of the field of vision we should not be able to [see]. Limitation of perception is an important precondition for [sight]. . . . [Without this delimitation], spatial comprehension would not exist. . . . [Our] visual experience
itself contains the sum of [our] visual limitations, and in th[ose] limitation[s] imposed upon [our field of vision] by the eye, we have the basis for [our] spa[tial]
concept[s]” (“Das Malerbuch,” 86).
Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” 92.
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